



cyber

COLLECTIVE

September Announcements

Serving Our Communities

Thank You, Technology First!

Cyber 101 for Law Enforcement
SUCCESS!

HIPPA Workshop, Axis Experience
Vehicle

LEADS Nov. 4

2025 GoCyber CTF Nov. 6



September
GoCyber Collective
Keynote Speaker

- Anna Blair
- Senior Systems Engineer – KBR Inc.
- University of Dayton Graduate (Bachelors and Masters)
- Shifting Your Cybersecurity Lens. Start System-wide.

By Slidesgo

Securing What Matters: A Systems Perspective on Cyber Risk

Anna Blair
Sr. Systems Engineer, KBR Inc.
[Linkedin.com/in/anna-g-blair](https://www.linkedin.com/in/anna-g-blair)

Speaker Bio

- ⇒ Education, University of Dayton
 - BS Biochemistry
 - MS Renewable & Clean Energy
- ⇒ Educational Experience
 - Chaminade-Julienne High School
 - KBR Internship Program
 - AFIT/LS Continuing Education + more
- ⇒ Customer Experience
 - AFLCMC program offices
 - AFRL
 - AFIT





Intro to System Safety

STPA and STPA-Sec



Intro to System Safety

- ⇒ Technology changes faster than safety methods
- ⇒ Not enough opportunity to learn from experience
- ⇒ Changing nature of accidents: more involve software/digital components
- ⇒ Increasing complexity & coupling in systems
- ⇒ Decreasing tolerance for single accidents
- ⇒ More complex relationships between humans and automation
- ⇒ Changing regulatory & public views of safety

“Incremental improvements in traditional safety engineering approaches over time have not resulted in significant improvement in our ability to engineer safer systems.”

- Nany Leveson, PhD, *Engineering a Safer World*

Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis


STPA

1) Define Purpose of The Analysis

2) Model The Control Structure

3) Identify Unsafe Control Actions

4) Identify Loss Scenarios



STPA for Safety and Security

Safety


- ⇒ **Hazards** lead to **safety incidents**
- ⇒ Prevent **unintentional** losses from **benevolent** actors


Shift security considerations from **tactics** (reactive) to **strategy** (proactive)

Security

- ⇒ **Vulnerabilities** lead to **security incidents**
- ⇒ Prevent **intentional** losses from **malevolent** actors
- ⇒ STPA must be extended to consider intentionally unsafe actions in **Step 4**

Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis for Security ◆ (STPA-Sec) ◆








Let's take a look!

Now that we know the theory, let's apply it to a real-world cybersecurity issue, and observe the benefits.

I need an app... ✨

I need an app to help turn our precious pets into **animal-influencers!** I want to design a platform for pet-related **lifestyle content, e-commerce,** and access to **pet-sitting services** all in one place! ✨






01

Define the Analysis


Identify losses and hazards that could lead to a loss





1: Define the Purpose of Analysis

- ⇒ Identify Losses
 - L1: Pet harm
 - L2: Financial loss
 - **L3: Privacy breach**
 - L4: Reputational damage
 - L5: Platform trust erosion
 - L6: Physical security risk
- ⇒ Identify Hazards (under the right conditions, could lead to a loss)
 - H1: Unverified providers
 - H2: Weak authentication
 - **H3: Insecure payment handling**
 - H4: Overexposed location data
 - H5: Malicious content injection
 - H6: Unmoderated communication



02

Model the Control Structure

Identify the controller, system under control, and control actions




Model the Control Structure




Booking/purchase confirmation
Shipping notification
User likes/comments

Book pet sitter
Purchase product
Publish content






Confirm payment
Validate users
Publish content




Send payment information
Share location/billing/shipping address



Identify Unsafe Control Actions

03





Unsafe Control Actions

UCA1: Provide	The app provides payment credentials to third parties without proper authorization
UCA2: Not Provide	The app fails to restrict access to sensitive data (keeps payment data visible or poorly protected)
UCA3: Incorrect Timing/Order	The app processes a transaction before verifying sitter/vendor identity, enabling fraud
UCA4: Stopped Too Soon/Applied Too Long	The app retains payment or personal data longer than necessary, increasing exposure in case of a breach




- **UCA1:** A poorly written API shares full payment details with their-party pet sitter services instead of using secure tokens
- **UCA2:** Developer debug logs accidentally store unencrypted credit card data, which is later exposed during a server misconfiguration
- **UCA3:** The app lets a sitter/walker accept bookings and charge users before their background check or payment account validation completes
- **UCA4:** The app keeps users' full billing information indefinitely, instead of deleting or anonymizing it after a transaction, so a breach years later still compromises old customers

04

Identify Loss Scenarios

How unsafe control actions could arise



Possible Mitigations/Safety Constraints

- ⇒ SC1: Limit Exposure
 - ⇒ The app shall tokenize all payment credentials and never share raw payment details outside the secure processor
- ⇒ SC2: Protect Data Lifecycle
 - ⇒ The app shall purge sensitive data (billing info, PII) after its intended use period
- ⇒ SC3: Verify Before Transaction
 - ⇒ The app shall complete vendor/sitter identity checks before enabling payment processing
- ⇒ SC4: Audit & Monitor
 - ⇒ The app shall log all payment access events securely and alert on anomalous activity

Thanks!

Do you have any questions?

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References

- ⇒ Nancy Leveson, *Engineering a Safer World*
- ⇒ Ivo Friedberg et al, *STPA-SafeSec: Safety and security analysis for cyber-physical systems*
- ⇒ William Young, *Basic Introduction to STPA for Security (STPA-Sec)*
- ⇒ William Young & Nancy Leveson, *An Integrated Approach to Safety and Security Based on Systems Theory*

September GoCyber Collective Spotlight

- David Sutherin
- Founder & Cyber Compliance Program Director – Triumvirate Cybersecurity Consulting
- CMMC for the Little Guy: January 27

NIST SP
800-171

News

DFARS
252.204-
7021

September 17th, 2025

Cybersecurity Compliance Updates

CMMMC FINAL!

EFFECTIVE DATE: NOVEMBER 10TH





CMMC Finalized in Federal Register

- **DFARS Case 2019-D041 Final Rule published September 10th**
- **Allows enforcement of CMMC requirements as a condition of contract award effective **November 10, 2025****
- **Original phased implementation plan would permit CMMC Level 1 and Level 2 self-assessments**
- **DoD memo from January specifies self-assessments are **not permitted** for contracts with CUI in the “Defense” category**
- **Extreme shortage of C3PAOs—booking 6+ months out**





Practical Implications

- If you handle CUI for defense work, expect **CMMC Level 2 certification** show up as a requirement in contracts beginning November 10th
- **Contact a C3PAO** to find out their lead time for assessment
- Be ready to provide self-attestation, at **minimum**, with evidence of intent to undergo an assessment ASAP (e.g., via attestation letter from C3PAO or RPO)



September GoCyber Collective Sponsor

- Thank you, Technology First!
- Taste of IT
- November 12, 2025
- Three Free Tickets



Threat Briefing

- ▶ Charles Zugaro – Cybersecurity Analyst – Warren County Telecommunications

September Threat Briefing: Emerging Vulnerabilities & Incidents

OAuth Token Theft in Salesloft Drift (Supply Chain Breach)

- Threat actors from the UNC6395 (GRUB1) cluster stole OAuth and refresh tokens from Salesloft's Drift AI chat agent
- Affected Systems: Salesloft Drift and connected Salesforce environments; over 700 organizations potentially impacted

HybridPetya Ransomware (UEFI Bootkit Exploitation)

- A new ransomware variant, HybridPetya, mimics the infamous Petya/NotPetya malware family that dates back to 2016
- Affected Systems: UEFI-based Windows systems using the vulnerable Howyar Reloader ("reloader.efi") component



September Threat Briefing: Emerging Vulnerabilities & Incidents

- CVE-2025-5086 in DELMIA Apriso (Remote Code Execution)
 - A critical deserialization vulnerability allows remote code execution via untrusted data in the FlexNetOperationsService endpoint. Exploits deliver a Base64-encoded, GZIP-compressed malicious DLL ("fwitxz01.dll") that acts as a Trojan for spying (keylogging, screenshots, app monitoring) and data exfiltration
 - Affected Systems: DELMIA Apriso Manufacturing Operations Management software (versions 2020–2025)

October Speakers: Zach Heck – Taft

- Cybersecurity Month
- Privacy
- Security
- Government Contracts
- Reducing Risk
- Ensuring Compliance
- Law



Information

Email me at john@GoCyberCollective.org.

If you have a suggestion on meeting topics, special interest groups, breakfast menu, or anything else we want to hear from you.

You can register for future breakfast meetings from the website.

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